Faculty Forum Online, Alumni Edition: Reducing Nuclear Threats in Iran and Beyond

Faculty Forum Online, Alumni Edition: Reducing Nuclear Threats in Iran and Beyond


Hi, I’m Whitney Espitch, the CEO
of the MIT Alumni Association, and I hope you enjoy this
digital production created for alumni and friends like you Steve, thanks for joining
us, and we’re looking forward to hearing your
thoughts about how we can reduce the risks
posed by nuclear weapons. Well, thank you so
much for having me. I became engaged in these
issues about 40 years ago when I was an undergraduate
physics major at MIT. And several of the
physics faculty at MIT were concerned about an
intensified nuclear arms race. This was in the late 1970s. Several, including Vicki
Bischoff, Phil Morrison, Bernie Feld, Tony French had
been members of the Manhattan Project. Henry Kendall co-founded the
Union of Concerned Scientists, and their first major
issue was missile defense. The president of MIT at
the time, Sherry Weesner, had been President
Kennedy’s science adviser, and he was also speaking
out on these issues. So it was an exciting time to
be a student with those mentors, and I had the opportunity to
have an undergraduate research opportunity program
experience with [INAUDIBLE] and that led me down this path. So let me just bring up
some slides and first, being a little primer
on nuclear weapons. As you probably know,
all nuclear weapons use fission reactions,
the splitting of atoms. And the most common atoms are
uranium 235 and plutonium 239. Now uranium only is 0.7% of
that isotope uranium 235. It can be fission easily. And so to produce
highly enriched uranium, the material there
is used in a fission explosive and nuclear weapon. You need to increase that
concentration at 90%, and that’s done. We have no uranium
isotope enrichment, and there are several
processes that are used to separate out the isotopes. But the most common Tao is
gas centrifuge technology. And so a lot of the controversy
surrounding the programs in North Korea and Iran concern
that gas centrifuge technology because you also need to
enrich uranium for you to produce nuclear fuel
for nuclear reactors. And so restricting access
to enrichment technology is key to restricting
the ability of countries to produce nuclear weapons. You can also use plutonium. Plutonium doesn’t
exist in nature, but is produced in nuclear
reactors and nuclear fuel. It has to be
chemically separated from the highly
radioactive spent fuel, and that’s done in a
reprocessing plant. And that is also technology that
we seek to restrict or spread. So the first fission
weapons were developed in the Manhattan Project. The first weapon that was used– the weapon used that
was used on Hiroshima– was a gun type weapon
where you simply assemble a critical mass
of highly enriched uranium by firing an HEU bullet
into an HEU target. And that requires
a lot of material. “Little Boy” contains
64 kilograms of HEU and produced a yield of 15,000
tons of TNT or 15 kilotons. But the more efficient way
to produce the fission weapon is with a plunge using
high explosives to squeeze. A sphere in the case of
the “Fat Man” device. Today it would be
a spherical shell. It’s more efficient. And you see the “Fat
Man” device used only 6 kilograms of plutonium
but produced 20,000 tons of TNT explosive yield. Most of today’s weapons– all
of the weapons in the arsenal of the United States, Russia,
France, UK, and China– are thermonuclear weapons,
so they use a fission device as a primary. So high explosive squeeze– a sphere, a shell of plutonium
usually and that fission explosion– then the radiation
from that explosion is used to compress a physically
separate secondary, which has fusion fuel and fission fuel. And the secondary generates
most of the yield in the device, and there’s really no limit
to the heel of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union
produced weapons with a yield of 100 million
tons of TNT, 100 megatons. Most of the nuclear
weapons deployed today by the US and the Soviet
Union have an average yield of about 350,000 tons of
TNT, and of course, these are incredible yields. And just to remind you of the
devastation that can occur, this is the scene at
Hiroshima a few days after the detonation of
that 15,000 kiloton weapon that resulted in the
deaths of 125,000 people. Fortunately, no
nuclear weapons have been used since 1945 since
the Hiroshima and Nagaski detonations. But you can calculate
what the effects will be of the detonation of
a modern nuclear weapon and thermonuclear
nuclear weapon. And here is the area that
would be totally destroyed by blast and fire. If a typical strategic
nuclear weapon were detonated
above Washington DC, you see it would be a
huge area of devastation. Roughly about a million
people would die immediately in the first few days
from such detonation. So the stakes are very
high with nuclear weapons because these are such
destructive weapons, and it may seem amazing. But at one point,
the United States had 30,000 of these nuclear
weapons in our arsenal, and Russia had 40,000 nuclear
weapons in its arsenal– a total of almost
70,000 combined. Now this has come
down substantially since the end of the Cold War. So some sanity was introduced
in the US-Russian arsenals, and they are now
about 4,000 each. On the other hand,
there has been an increase in the number of
countries with nuclear weapons with Israel, India,
Pakistan, and now North Korea deploying
their own nuclear arsenals. And to show how many of
these we have, as I said, the United States and Russia
have about 4,000 each. France, China, and the
UK have a few hundred. Pakistan and India and
those arsenals, by the way, are not growing,
except for China. China may maybe increasing the
number of weapons it deploys. But in the other P5 countries
the permanent five members of the UN’s Security Council,
those numbers are about stable. Pakistan and India are both
producing nuclear weapons. There’s more uncertainty
with regard to Israel. And of course, in the
case, of North Korea, North Korea continues,
so far as we know, to produce plutonium
and high-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, and
so its arsenal is probably increasing slowly. But a total in the world
on the order of 10,000 of these weapons still. So when you think
of those images I showed before of the
district the capacity of one nuclear weapon and
then you multiply that by 9,000 or 10,000. You can see the risk potential
for not just the United States but the entire world. And so President
Obama, as a senator, was very concerned
about nuclear risks, and wanted to focus
as a president on reducing those risks. One of the earliest major
speeches that he gave was in Prague in April 2009,
and he laid out a blueprint for reducing nuclear
risks and that blueprint had four pillars. The first pillar was to reduce
the role of nuclear weapons in our secure overall
security defense strategy and to urge other
countries to do the same and that was
negotiated in a treaty to reduce deployed nuclear
weapons with Russia, to seek further cuts
beyond that– cuts not just in US and
Russian arsenals but all nuclear weapons states,
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. I see the C is missing. It should be CTBT,
which treaty that bans the testing
of nuclear weapons and to negotiate a fissile
material cutoff treaty– a treaty that would
ban the production of high-enriched uranium
and plutonium for weapons. So that was the first pillar. The second pillar
was to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective US nuclear arsenal, to deter any adversary so
long as nuclear weapons exist. The third pillar was to
strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
and as part of that, to build a new framework for
civil nuclear cooperation, but most importantly, to bring
Iran and North Korea back into compliance with
the Nonproliferation Treaty and then, finally, to
ensure that terrorists never fire a nuclear weapon. And the major element
in that pillar was an effort to secure all
nuclear materials– all HVU and plutonium. So how did we do it? I say we because we did have
the great privilege of working in the White House
for five years as I’ve even mentioned–
the first three years and the last two years
of the Obama administration. During the first
three years was a time of defining and developing
these new policy and then in the last
two years, trying to make progress on the agenda. So there was a new
START treaty with Russia that resulted in a
one-third reduction in deployed strategic
weapons and that [INAUDIBLE].. We conducted a
nuclear posture review that changed US policy
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
states that are in compliance with their nonproliferation
obligations under the NPT also a policy not to develop
new nuclear weapons or new nuclear capabilities. There was a review
of nuclear employment policy that determined
that we could undertake further reductions. And so I think in
2013, the president announced that we could reduce
nuclear weapons by another one third and invited
President Putin from Russia to engage in negotiations
toward that end and also to work
for the first time to reduce stockpiles of
tactical nuclear weapons and to engage other countries– the other nuclear weapon
states in the negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons. On the nuclear
material front, there were a series of nuclear
security summits. And as a result, plenty
of [INAUDIBLE] countries made during those summits. Four tons 4,000 kilograms
of enriched uranium was removed, including
all of the HEU being removed from 33 countries. And then, finally– excuse me– maybe a crowning achievement
for the Obama administration was the joint comprehensive
plan of action under which Iran
agreed [AUDIO OUT] of its nuclear program. Of course, now the
Trump striation has withdrawn the United
States from that agreement, but the agreement
still remains in force with the other parties. So Iran remains in compliance. Inspectors from the
International Atomic Agency remain at the Iranian facilities
and the UK, France, European Union, Germany, China,
all remain parties to that agreement. But we didn’t achieve everything
that we hoped to achieve. One of the ironies
of achieving a treaty is a treaty requires
Senate ratification. 2/3 of senators need to vote in
favor for a treaty [INAUDIBLE].. And part of the deal for that
was with Republican senators was to modernize the
US nuclear force, which I’ll talk about a
bit more detail, replacing essentially all
of the legs of the triad. And this plan has remained
essentially unchanged under President Trump. But as you will
see, very expensive. And in the Obama
nuclear posture review, there was a rejection
of a proposed policy that the only use of nuclear
weapons by the United States was to turn the use of
nuclear weapons [INAUDIBLE].. This is closely related with
the idea of no first use that the United States would
only use nuclear weapons in retaliation. It would never
use weapons first. Those were deferred under Obama. In the Trump nuclear
posture review that was released
earlier this year, these goals were
explicitly repudiated. There was a failure to
begin follow-on negotiations with Russia on
nuclear reductions. That failure continues on
today, I’m afraid to say. This has largely been due to
Russia’s concerns about US ballistic missile defenses,
which they view as a threat to their deterrent forces. With the degraded
relations with Russia, particularly after the Russian
invasion of Ukraine or Crimea and then the imposition
of US sanctions, cooperation with Russia on
nuclear missile material security ended in 2014. And of course, we have North
Korea because of failures to constrain the North
Korean nuclear program. And despite the statements,
by the Trump administration, that failure
continues there really are no meaningful constraints
on North Korean nuclear program. So let me talk about
just a few of these– really the first
three in more detail, although I’d be happy to
talk about any of them in question and answer. So first, with regard
to modernization, here is the current [INAUDIBLE]. We have 400 silo-based
ICBMs with one warhead each. We have 12 Trident submarines,
each that has two missiles. Each of those missiles
has about four warheads. We have 50 B-52
and 20 B-2 bombers that can be equipped
with nuclear bombs. We have some dual-capable
aircraft in Europe that can carry nuclear
bombs, and also we have a large stockpile
of reserve warheads that can increase the
number of warheads that are deployed on those forces. All of these systems
are [AUDIO OUT],, and here is the proposed
modernization plan that cost about in the order. So we’ve just begun the
program to replace the Trident submarines. And about one of
these submarines will be replaced every year
beginning in about 2030. The [AUDIO OUT] will be
late 2020s on a trial basis. And that program will cost
about $170 billion views. There is a program to
replace all of the ICBMs, called the ground be
strategic and that will cost $100 billion. And the program to build about
100 new bombers and the cost of about $130 billion dollars. Those bombers would
be dual capable. About $400 billion in all
over about a 20-year period with a peak spending of over
$22 billion dollars a year. That’s just the
modernization cost. That is on top of the
normal operation, which are projected to be, over that
period, about $900 billion. So that’s a total of
about $1.3 trillion, which is a lot of money,
even by Department of Defense standards. Department of Defense
likes to point out that this is less than
10% of the DoD budget. I prefer to say this is
more than all the research funding for the
federal government if you exclude NIH also. You can see it from buying
bits of EPA treasury, labor, and interior. So it’s a lot of money. And one way that we could save
money and improve security, improve strategic
stability, I believe, would be to eliminate
silo-based ICBMs and with it to eliminate
an option to launch those missiles on warning. So the problem is that
those missiles are vulnerable to a Russian attack. And because they are
vulnerable to a Russian attack, we keep them on
continuous alert, ready to fire on warning. When US [INAUDIBLE]
would detect the launch of a Russian missile, we
could launch those ICBMs before they would be
destroyed by Russian forces. The problem is that
requires a quick decision by the president on whether
to launch on warning. And Russia is in exactly
the same situation. In fact, it’s even
worse for Russia because they’re more
reliant on ICBMs, and this does raise the
concern about the possibility of a false warning. What if there were a failure
in the warning system? [AUDIO OUT] to believe we were
[AUDIO OUT] attack incorrectly. Also launch on
warning is pointless because our ICBMs are targeted
on Russian nuclear forces. But if we were launching on
a true warning of attack, Russia would already
launch its forces or would launch them on
warning of our counterstrike. There’s really no
to having these to having these missiles ready
to launch on warning of attack. And [AUDIO OUT] would save
somewhere between $100 to $150 billion. So that’s one policy proposal
that I and others have floated. Another would be to adopt
a policy of sole purpose. I’ll just say this
is really concern about who has the authority
to use nuclear weapons. Right now, the president is the
only one with the authority, and there is no one
with any ability to question his authority to use
nuclear weapons for any reason, including for [AUDIO OUT]. There are two bills in Congress
right now– one by Adam Smith that would adopt a policy
of no first use and one by Congressman Markey
and Lieu to require congressional authorization
to use nuclear weapons first. And the final issue
I wanted to mention was limiting ballistic
missile defenses. And although we intend our
ballistic missile defenses to defend against Iranian
and North Korean missiles, we’re at a bit of a paradox
with missile defense, in that it can be
both ineffective and counterproductive. Ineffective because the current
defenses intercept missile warheads in mid-course in space,
and a defense in space is very vulnerable to countermeasures
because in space, everything moves along
the same trajectory– a warhead, light balloons,
warhead inside balloons all move in the same way. And so it’s hard to tell the
difference between the warhead and the decoys. But counterproductive
[AUDIO OUT] in China worry that its
missiles [AUDIO OUT] be vulnerable to our [AUDIO OUT]
has caused them to increase or modify their
offensive forces. You may have noticed
an announcement by President Putin
about two months ago of the offensive
systems [AUDIO OUT].. ICBM to carry a
hypersonic glide vehicle or attack the United
States by going around the south pole, a
nuclear-powered torpedo, and a nuclear-powered
cruise missile. All of these things
don’t make any sense, except as counters to
US missile defense. So the question is, can we
provide an effective defense against Iran and North
Korea without triggering the counterreactions
by China and Russia? And in the case
of Iran, at first, we note that, well,
missile threats are really minor if
the missiles are not armed with nuclear weapons. And so it is very important
to keep Iran in compliance with the JCPOA and not
producing new material. Iran has stated
that it has no plans to deploy missiles with a range
greater than 2000 kilometers. I think we should take
Iran up on that offer and join with Russia to
negotiate a verifiable limit on the range of its missiles. If that could be done, there
would be no need for the US to deploy defenses against
long-range missiles and no need to trigger these Russian
counter reactions. In the case of
North Korea, there is a real need to protect
not only the United States, but our allies, South
Korea and Japan, from North Korean missiles. The current defenses
are probably not effective because North Korea
can develop countermeasures, but I and some collaborators
have been advocating a boost phase defense where
we put interceptors on unmanned aircrafts that
orbit most of North Korea. And those could shoot
down [AUDIO OUT] in their boost phase. And that system would
have no capability against Russia or China. So with that, why don’t I stop
and take questions if you can– Yes, that sounds good. Just before we jump
in, let me just remind everyone that if you
have questions for Steve, feel free to throw them
our way, whether that’s via the Q&A feature in
Zoom or in the comments panel in YouTube live. And I see Joe has
mentioned to people who are curious about the
slides and getting back into– if you missed
something that Steve had said, that’ll be available
after the webcast is over. Let me start with just
a question for myself. You just ran through a bunch
of different ideas, first steps that we could take. When we think about our
nuclear policy and the future– if you could pick
just one of those, if you could just make
one happen tomorrow, is there one in
particular that’s sort of near and
dear to your heart that you think would be far away
the most effective step that we could take right now? Well, probably because I worked
on it more than the others. I think eliminating the
replacement for the ICBM would be the one I would
pick because it really is the source of instability
in our nuclear relationship with Russia. It’s also the one
thing that forces or that woulds force
the president to make a decision very quickly
about using nuclear weapons. It is the system that forces
this very short timeline where a president really would
literally only have two or three minutes to make a
decision and all of that is forced by the fact that ICBMs
cannot survive an attack. So I think we could improve
stability and save money by not replacing the minute man ICBM. OK, let me ask a question
from one of our attendees here wants to know,
why does the US rank so low in nuclear
weapons security? Well, I don’t know that
we rank low in nuclear– is it the security of
our own nuclear weapons or the threat that we
face from nuclear weapons from other countries? Well, I guess I’m not sure
what this person meant, and they should feel free to
throw a clarification to Q & A. But I think the threat
from other countries is definitely something that’s
coming up in the questions. Some want to know if we’re
vulnerable to a Fukushima-like event, things like that. Well, it’s the very
nature of nuclear weapons that, as you saw, even one
nuclear weapon is so incredibly destructive that any defense
against nuclear weapons would have to be perfect. And a perfect defense
is just impossible because nuclear weapons
are so destructive. And this is one of the
features of the nuclear age is that we have to live
with this vulnerability to nuclear destruction,
and the task is to minimize that, to ensure
that nuclear weapons are deployed in a way that gives no
one an incentive to use them. OK, well, actually,
that kind of relates to question I have
here from Alfred. Alfred says it seems that
the worry today is not Russia, but dirty bombs
and nuclear bombs that do not have to work very well. Countries like Iran do not
need a large number of bombs– just enough to make a point. How do you defend against those? Yeah, this is the terrible
thing about nuclear weapons is that to defend
against them effectively, you would need a perfect defense
and that’s just not possible. Even if we could defend
against missiles, there are other ways of
delivering a nuclear weapon– covert ways that would be
difficult or impossible to detect. And that’s why it
is so important to secure nuclear
materials to prevent absolutely any possibility
of high-enriched uranium or plutonium becoming available
to terrorists, to try to limit the spread of those
materials, and the technology to improve that. But I do want to say
that I personally do not think that
the main threat is from terrorists or Iran. I am still very much concerned
with the threat from Russia because it’s an
enormous arsenal. And although I think
the probability of the use of nuclear weapons
by Russia is very low, any use of nuclear weapons
by the US or Russia would likely escalate and
would be catastrophic. And there is the potential
for a conflict with Russia. I think we saw that
potential in Ukraine. There is concern about possible
conflict in the Baltic states on the fringes of NATO. Russia has said that
it reserves the right to respond to conflict
with nuclear weapons. Russia has adopted
a so-called escalate to de-escalate
doctrine where they would use nuclear weapons
in a conventional conflict with NATO or the United
States to force us to come to our senses and de-escalate. I think those sorts of policies
are incredibly dangerous. So I do think it is
still worth worrying about the nuclear
threat from Russia. So when we think about
those threats and what might happen today or
in the next few years, we’ve had a few questions
come in about the Trump administration and what
might happen going forward. Someone wanted to
know, do you expect to see any effective policy
improvement from the Trump administration. Well, one can always hope. I thought at the beginning
of the Trump administration that perhaps one
of the bright signs would be his desire
to improve relations with Russia and always near
the top of the policy agenda with Russia. Our reductions in nuclear
forces and cooperation to reduce other nuclear risks. But the President Trump has
been constrained in his ability to open up negotiations
with Russia due to the investigations of
the election, interference in the American election,
and in other factors. There have been
recent talks about him extending the new START treaty. So I think that there is a
possibility of cooperation between US and Russia
in reducing these risks. OK, a few people
want to know too if there’s steps
that can be taken now to strengthen or improve the
NPT and what kinds of things we might want to see there. Well, basically,
the were two tracks. One is bringing in
the countries who are not in compliance, Iran and
North Korea, into compliance. And I think the Obama
administration made great progress in that regard. I don’t think it has been
productive for the US to withdraw from the Iran deal. I think that it harms
the nonproliferation treaty and regime. On one of my slides was
a policy of no first use. I think one of
the best things we can do to strengthen the
nonproliferation treaty would be to declare that the only
purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to a
nuclear attack on the United States or its allies
and pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. After all, the United States
is by far the most powerful military power in the world. If we can’t defend ourselves
against conventional attack without nuclear weapons,
then every other country would have an even
greater argument for wanting nuclear weapons. And what most
other countries say they want from the United States
and from the other nuclear weapons states are
steady reductions in the number of
nuclear weapons. So the beginning of
negotiations with Russia and the other members
of the P5 on reducing nuclear arsenals– that
would be the other main step to reinforce the NPT. OK, let me fire another
one at you from someone wants to know if we could come
to acceptable nonproliferation agreements with Iran, North
Korea, or whoever else you might want to make
those agreements with– how do you verify compliance? Is there a sense
of the best method to take when turning to that? So with Iran, there really is
a very elaborate verification system that was outlined in
the joint comprehensive plan of action– the Iran deal. There are IAEA inspectors at
the nuclear facilities that are verifying that no nuclear
material is being diverted, that only low-enriched uranium
that is suitable for reactor fuel is being produced, that
no high-enriched uranium is produced that could
be used for weapons. The concern with Iran is
mostly about the possibility [INAUDIBLE] some
clandestine site. But our best chance for
detecting such a facility is to have inspectors
on the ground who can take environmental
samples but also who can interact
with the scientists and engineers in the
Iran nuclear program and that would be our best
chance of detecting any hidden activities. With regard to North
Korea, I am less hopeful of reaching an agreement
that would end or dismantle their nuclear program. Now that North Korea
has nuclear weapons and has in fact tested
more sophisticated and high yield nuclear weapons,
North Korea successfully tested long-range missiles. I think it will be very
difficult to negotiate an end to that program. I think the best that we can
hope for in the near term is to freeze the
program where it is– to end the production
of new plutonium, high-enriched uranium, to
cap the size of the arsenal, to end testing of
nuclear weapons, and testing of missiles. To freeze the program where
it is would be a positive step and would then give us
time to perhaps negotiate additional restrictions. So that’s interesting. It relates to a question
I have here from MMCMA who notes that one
criticism of the JCPOA is that it has a
sunset provision, so that the restrictions
on Iran’s program go away after 15 years. He wants to know do you
have any thoughts on that? So there’s a whole
set of restrictions on Iran under the JCPOA, and
they have different sunset provisions. One provision, the
main provision, has no sunset and that
is that Iran will never produce high-enriched uranium,
and it will never produce and develop nuclear weapons. So there is an indefinite
commitment by Iran not to do that. There was a 10-year restriction
on the number of centrifuges and the amount of low-enriched
uranium it could produce. Iran has a nuclear
energy program. They have nuclear reactors
under construction from Russia. They would like to supply
fuel for those reactors, so there is a legitimate
civilian purpose. They also have research
reactors that they can use, low-enriched uranium that
they produce to supply the fuel for those reactors. So I think that the challenge
is to remain engaged with Iran and to match its
uranium enrichment program to its legitimate
civilian needs. OK, well, we’re coming
near the end here. I think we have time for maybe
one or two more questions, so I’ll just try to throw at
least one more major world conflict for you to solve. Matthew Weinberg wants to know
are de-escalation mechanisms in place to prevent an
India-Pakistan nuclear exchange? And is this the most worrisome
situation in your view? It is a very
worrisome situation– largely because of how India,
Pakistan view the threat from each other. So Pakistan apparently
believes that because it has nuclear weapons
that India would not dare to initiate a
conventional war with Pakistan, particularly one
that were packed where Indian forces would
cross the border into Pakistan. And Pakistan has
threatened that should that happen they would use
nuclear weapons to defeat an Indian invasion. India, on the other
hand, has said that any use of nuclear
weapons by Pakistan would lead to an
all-out retaliation by India against Pakistan. So I think that is the
seeds for miscalculation that because Pakistan may
believe that it can do it with impunity
interfere in Kashmir, undertake other military
operations against India. India might miscalculate and
retaliate against Pakistan conventionally. And that might trigger
a small Pakistan a nuclear response, which may
trigger a massive or large Indian response. And I do think there is a
serious basis for concern. [AUDIO OUT] I
think if there were the prospect for any
conventional war between India or Pakistan, the United
States, other countries, would be very
concerned and I hope we would try to intervene
to help de-escalate. OK, well, I think that
takes us right to 12:45. So on behalf of the
Alumni Association, I want to thank everyone
for tuning into this faculty forum online. And of course, Steve,
thank you so much again for sharing your
expertise with us today. Thank you. For anyone who had a question
that we didn’t get to, alumni office staff are going
to forward all those questions to Steve if they weren’t
addressed on air. If you want to tweet
about today’s chat, you can use the hashtag
#MITbetterworld. And if you have follow-up
questions or feedback, feel free to email
[email protected]– so that’s [email protected] So thanks again,
everyone, for watching. Thanks for joining us. And for more information on how
to connect with the MIT Alumni Association, please
visit our website.

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